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Abstract Sixteen essays written by the students who participated in the PAGES 
2011 Summer School are presented. They were written stimulated by the lectures 
and  students’ discussions during the Summer School. Their essays focus on issues 
observed at the interface between technology and society, such as risk/cost versus 
benefit, rationality and irrationality, communication, and the role of nuclear engineers.
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17.1  Format for Students’ Discussion  
at the Summer School
When the 2011 PAGES Summer School was organized, the central consideration 
was providing students with sufficient time and guidance for discussions. It was 
deemed crucial to make students’ discussions integrative and free of stereotypical 
perceptions from their own fields.
Morning discussions spanned 30 min, and afternoon sessions included a 90-min 
“reflection and discussion” slot. In these latter sessions, discussants were desig-
nated to lead the discussion; three postdoctoral researchers, Dr. Mary Sunderland, 
Dr. Robert A. Borrelli, and Dr. Takuji Oda, took on this role, as well as contributing 
chapters to this book. They encouraged interaction among participants by propos-
ing points to be explored and steering discussion as needed. Table 17.1 is the list of 
lectures and lecturers. Stemming from these lectures, students were encouraged to 
join in discussion with their fellow students and lecturers.




Table 17.1  List of lecture(r)s at PAGES 2011 Summer School and questions provided by lecturers
8/1 
Mon.
Scientific analysis of radiation contamination at the area around the Fukushima-
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Prof. Satoru Tanaka (Univ. of Tokyo)
1. How can we improve the transmission of information?
2. How can we accelerate decontamination outside of the reactors site and people’s 
returning home?
Physics of Fukushima damaged reactors and its preliminary lessons, Prof. Naoyuki 
Takaki (Tokai Univ., Japan)
1. How serious is the consequence of Fukushima accident? Consider from various 
views, such as the number of deaths; health risk for current and future generations; 
fears and inconvenience imposed on the public; impact on economy, etc. Is it 
unacceptable even if benefit (energy) derived from it is considered?
2. If society allows continuous use of nuclear, what attributes should a nuclear system 
in the new era have? Give a concrete image/concept of such a new nuclear system 
(e.g., reactor plant and its fuel cycle)
Radiation safety regulation under emergency condition, Prof. Toshiso Kosako (Univ. 
of Tokyo)
1. What do we think about the emergency workers dose limit? (Cf. Japanese 
regulation: 100 mSv, changed to 250 mSv in this period) What happened to the 
remediators’ working conditions when dose limits are exceeded while working on 
emergency tasks?
2. What do you think about evacuation for the general public under a nuclear 
emergency situation? (Cf. Japanese regulation: 10 km as a typical evacuation zone) 
What kind of arrangement is possible after using SPEEDI code? The arranged area 
should be circle or fan-shape?
3. What is the main reason for administration of iodine pills to children? (Japanese 
regulation: about 40 mg for children)
4. What kind of arrangement is effective for making surface contamination maps? 
Use only radiation monitoring?
5. What do you think about the radiation level for school playgrounds? What is your 
idea for a dose rate guideline?
6. Is it possible to remove contaminated soil by slicing off 5 cm for the decontamination of 
radionuclide in all areas of Fukushima prefecture?




Impact of Fukushima for reactor design practice, Prof. Per Peterson (UC Berkeley)
1. Discuss “backfitting” policy (10 CFR50.109 in the U.S.) which establishes the 
types of changes that a national regulatory authority can require for existing 
nuclear facilities. Consider analogies to policies for when existing buildings must 
be upgraded to meet new building code requirements, and requirements for when 
automobiles and consumer products must be recalled for repair or replacement. 
Discuss the societal tradeoffs in requiring backfitting (balance of the cost of 
backfitting against the benefit of improved safety). Discuss how backfitting policy 
might affect decisions to introduce improvements in new reactor designs
2. Considering the vertical axis of the Farmers chart for the frequency of internal 
initiating events, discuss the commercial risks associated with introducing different 
fuels and materials in new reactor designs, and how such risks can be reduced
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Ethics, risk and uncertainty: reflections on Fukushima and beyond, Prof. William  
E. Kastenberg (UC Berkeley)
1. Are risk analysis methodologies robust enough to assess and manage the risk of 
core-melt accidents, such as at Fukushima, i.e. could the accident have been  
predicted or mitigated?
2. Was emergency planning and emergency response adequate enough to protect 
public health and safety both before and after the Fukushima accident?
3. Was there an adequate “safety culture” in place prior to and following the accident?
4. What would it take to improve the quality of risk analysis and emergency planning 
so that the loss of public confidence could have been avoided?
8/3
Wed.
“Failure” of regulation and issues in public policy studies, Prof. Hideaki Shiroyama 
(Univ. of Tokyo)
1. Who and what mechanism should play roles for searching and integrating diverse 
knowledge that is necessary for managing complex system?
2. What is the way for strengthening regulatory capacity? Or how to keep civilian 
nuclear regulatory power without military use (which provide fund and personnel)? 
Or is it possible to restructure voluntary safety capability?
3. Is it possible and effective to organize and implement nuclear safety research  
separated from nuclear research and development in general?
The structural failure of the science-technology-society interface: a hidden accident 
long before Fukushima, Prof. Miwao Matsumoto (Univ. of Tokyo)
1. How was the mutual relationship between success and failure in the little known 
but serious accident happened during wartime mobilization?
2. How do you think is the mutual relationship between success and failure in the 
Fukushima accident?
3. What are the similarity and the difference between the accident during wartime 
mobilization and the Fukushima accident in terms of the mutual relationship 
between success and failure in the science-technology-society interface?
4. What do you think about possibility of detecting the cause of structural failure in 
advance and incorporate structural remedies, if there are, in your design practice?
Three mile Island and Fukushima: some reflections on the history of nuclear power, 
Dr. J. Samuel Walker (Former USNRC Historian)
1. What are the most important lessons of Three Mile Island?
2. To what extent would a good understanding of the lessons of Three Mile Island 
have been helpful in the response to Fukushima? Would they have been useful in 
reacting promptly and as effectively as possible to the technical failures caused by 
the earthquake and tsunami? Would they have been helpful in responding to media 
questions and public fears about the effects, real and potential, of the accident?
3. Is it ever appropriate to intentionally provide information to the public about a 
nuclear accident that is incomplete, overly optimistic, or misleading? If so, under 
what conditions?
4. How do authorities deal with the problem of providing accurate and up-to-date 
information when their own knowledge of the situation after a nuclear plant acci-
dent is fragmentary?
5. Are the benefits of nuclear power worth the risks?
Table 17.1 (continued)
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Students formed small groups (about 4–6 people) during the group discussion/
work sessions. This grouping was undertaken by the students themselves, and was 
based on shared interests. Students repeatedly held discussions within the groups 
and formulated tentative answers to some of the questions posed by lecturers, as 
well as other questions they found important in the larger group discussions.
To accelerate interactions among student participants, “student session” slots 
were scheduled for the evenings of August 2 and 3. In these sessions, the students 
gave oral presentations that introduced their own, often quite intensive, activities 
after the Fukushima accident, described their thoughts regarding the event, and 
sought feedback from other students and lecturers.
The four days of lectures and discussions then culminated in student pres-
entations on Friday, August 5. The self-organized student groups gave presen-
tations about their questions and answers and received feedback from lecturers 
and other participants. The summer school closed with a session of reflections 
by the lecturers and organizers and a general discussion with the student 
participants.
All students were required after completing the school to submit individual essays 
that described their own answers to the questions they chose to focus on, based on all 
of the discussions they participated in, including the concluding sessions.
The rest of this chapter consists of essays written by the participating stu-
dents. Note that some of these essays may seem ambiguous and confusing, 
which results from two reasons. One obvious reason is that some students were 
not native English speakers. The Editor has tried to reduce this kind of ambigu-
ity. The second and more fundamental reason is because of the complexity and 
ambiguity inherent in the topics themselves. The Editor intentionally left this 
8/4
Thu.
Engineers in organization, in industry and in society: ethical considerations,  
Prof. Jun Fudano (Kanazawa Institute of Tech., Japan)
1. Compare and contrast the Code of Ethics of the American Nuclear Society 
(http://www.new.ans.org/about/coe/) and its counterpart in Japan, namely, 
the Code of Ethics of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (http://www.aesj-
ethics.org/02_/02_03_/). Also make a list of values, in order of priority, which are 
stipulated in each code.
2. Which ethical principles have been violated in the case of the Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident?
3. Reflecting on the Fukushima Accident and referring to the above codes and any 
appropriate ones, write your own code of ethics (Cite all codes you used.)
4. Explain, to laypeople, why engineers, especially, nuclear engineers, have special 
responsibility
Long-Term Energy and Environmental Strategy, Prof. Yasumasa Fujii (Univ. of Tokyo)
1. When should we use Uranium resource in the long-term perspective of human 
civilization?
2. To what extent can we depend on intermittent renewable energy?
[After-dinner Talk] From Fukushima To the World: How to Learn from the Experience 
in Japan, Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan)
Note affiliations are as of August 2011
Table 17.1 (continued)
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type of ambiguity. Actually, these two kinds of ambiguity are not so clearly 
separable. The Editor hopes to have accomplished this complex task, and to 
successfully convey to the reader the students’ struggles to seek their answers.
17.2  Students’ Essays
17.2.1  Thoughts on Emergency Workers’ Dose Limit,  
by Toshiyuki Aratani, the University of Tokyo
I was able to think about various things as I participated in the PAGES 2011 
Summer School. While reflecting on the discussions at the summer school, 
I selected for my response the first question by Prof. Kosako: “What do we think 
about the emergency workers dose limit? (Cf. Japanese regulation: 100 mSv, 
changed to 250 mSv during this period) What happened to the remediators’ work-
ing conditions when dose limits are exceeded while working on emergency tasks?”.
The optimization of workers’ radiation dose should be considered. It is unfor-
tunate that while doing emergency work, workers are exposed to large doses. 
The emergency worker will not be able to work longer in the place when he has 
exceeded the dose limit. Because the accident has been protracted, skilled workers 
who were initially on the scene were forced to leave because they exceeded the 
dose limit. Therefore, further recovery work was in the hands of less skilled work-
ers. It is expected that the accident’s impact will result in a prolonged situation in 
which the public would have a greater amount of exposure. In addition, later work 
is also problematic for workers who exceed the dose limit. So, an emergency dose 
limit should not be set at too low a value, and policy decisions should be made on 
the optimization premise.
100 mSv was changed to 250 mSv in this period, in line with the ICRP2007 
recommendation written as follows: ~100 mSv—a dose for those engaged in 
emergency rescue; 500 mSv or 1000 mSv—doses to avoid deterministic effects 
may occur, as the dose of those engaged in emergency rescue; nothing—indicating 
that the lifesaving benefits outweigh the risks to life of others.
Evidence shows that there is not a clear current value. First of all, if we have 
adopted the recommendations of the ICRP value for other regulations, the amount 
of exposure in an emergency should also be adopted.
I have heard that nuclear power is earth-friendly, low cost. This may be right 
from one side, but from another side this might not be so. While the world is still 
actively using coal power generation, nuclear power is better to deal with global 
warming. With the end of the depreciation on a nuclear plant such as Fukushima 
Daiichi, the fixed costs become significantly less, which means more inexpen-
sive power unmatched by any other means. However, an old power plant like a 
Fukushima Daiichi can be a defense against disasters. I think it is probably safe 
even if more disasters occur. Even then, we must consider the mind-boggling issue 
of the destination for radioactive waste. And we must be prepared for ruin of the 
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land and its enormous cost. Each technology has advantages and disadvantages. 
Though inexpensive, fears about nuclear power have called for stopping its use 
from a simplistic point of view. But there is the risk that we will not find any other 
alternative energy. Thus, gridding and distributed energy development firms feel it 
necessary to increase research and development budgets.
17.2.2  The Role of Engineers in Democratic Societies,  
by Christian Di Sanzo, University of California, Berkeley
After the Fukushima accident, the governments of Germany and Switzerland have 
planned a phase-out of nuclear energy, while France and U.S. have decided to 
have little or no debate on the public’s concerns about nuclear energy. Other coun-
tries, such as Italy, have chosen the way of a national referendum on energy policy 
which led to halt of the nuclear program.
What should be the role of engineers and what are its limitations in the decision 
making process?
In simple terms, we could say that engineers should honestly evaluate the 
technological performance, technological costs, and the risks associated with the 
use of energy technologies. This information should be conveyed to policy mak-
ers who should use their judgment to evaluate the social/economic benefits and 
then choose a solution for the benefit of the public. However, in this process it is 
of crucial importance to understand the information that is conveyed by the engi-
neers. An energy analysis always has some uncertainties, e.g., in the numerical 
data available and in the expected cost of technologies. Consequently, all analysis 
should be conveyed to the policy makers with the related uncertainties. However, 
since policy makers often do not have a complete (all energy) background, it is 
hard for them to understand the real meaning of uncertainties, and they could 
often, even unconsciously, use them to fuel their own personal hopes for renew-
able energy or personal passions favoring oil companies. During this process the 
engineers could step in as advisors to policy makers as it is often done. However, 
the experts could often be tempted to hide some uncertainties in some results and 
overstate the importance of uncertainties in other results during the advising pro-
cess. In fact, each engineer is often specialized in his/her own field and conse-
quently he/she will be more passionate regarding his/her own specialization, such 
as nuclear engineering. The creation of expert figures with broad backgrounds 
could help in this regard. However, the final decision is in the hands of policy 
makers who are limited in their understanding of uncertainties. We could ask what 
would happen if the decision is in the hands of engineers as in a technocratic form 
of society. The risk of this approach would be that engineers would downplay the 
social consequences and have overconfidence in technologies, which is the oppo-
site effect (and potentially even more dangerous) of decision makers who overstate 
the social consequences and put confidence in technologies with low performance 
(such as renewables).
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A simple solution to this dilemma, whether energy policy decisions should be 
taken by scientific experts alone or by policy makers who often come with little 
scientific background, does not exist.
Engineers should limit their work to convey all possible data in an honest way, 
with the expectation that other engineers will do the same in their respective fields 
and that the public or policy makers will listen to experts’ analysis. However, these 
expectations are often unfulfilled.
The creation of mixed figures such as policy makers with technological back-
grounds could be a possible improvement. However, a division of roles in the deci-
sion making process between policy makers and engineers must be preserved to 
clearly identify who should have an unbiased scientific opinion and who should 
consider socio-political aspects during decision making.
17.2.3  Greater Public Good and Rationality,  
by Denia Djokic, University of California, Berkeley
In a society comprising many stakeholders, there is no consensus on the definition 
of the “greater public good.” For the case of each stakeholder, this utilitarian con-
struct is based on a certain combination of: information, misinformation, different 
ways of interpreting the same information, lack of information, and most of all, 
different value systems, some of which do not always fit into the neat frame of a 
traditional cost-benefit analysis.
In student discussions at this summer school, we tried to delve deeper into the 
meaning and function of the cost-benefit analysis. We asked questions such as 
whether seemingly “irrational decisions” were merely a different framing of the 
same cost-benefit analysis, where different stakeholders (e.g., nuclear engineers in 
contrast to the public) simply weigh the risks and the benefits differently. There is no 
simple answer, and furthermore I have no doubt that the solution depends on much 
more than just “communication” between the stakeholders. A good first step, how-
ever, is to encourage this kind of thought among the population that has traditionally 
been a major influence in top-down decisions: the nuclear engineering community.
All these insightful and fruitful discussions at the summer school made me 
wonder: why is it that we nuclear engineering students are not usually challenged 
to think this way? We seem to be well trained in our field, and yet there seems to 
be a very large gap in our education.
Undoubtedly, nuclear engineering students from UC Berkeley and the 
University of Tokyo are well educated in the breadth and depth of the discipline. 
However, in my nuclear engineering graduate school training to date, I have found 
that we are groomed to be inside-the-box thinkers without the necessary training to 
understand nuclear issues holistically. To solve technical problems, we are taught to 
draw clear boundaries around a limited problem, because without a clear definition, 
you cannot find a solution. Despite the fact that this method of solving problems 
often breaks down when scaling up to societal levels, the rhetoric among nuclear 
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engineers as a community seems to remain along the lines of either “do what we 
say, we are the experts,” or “if only we could make our data and methods clear 
enough, the public would understand and accept nuclear power.” Any discussion as 
to whether our assumptions about society could be wrong seems rarely encouraged 
in a traditional educational setting for nuclear engineers. As a result, students eas-
ily adopt this overbearing rhetoric from our role models, and then from each other, 
feeding the “hubris of the engineer” (as mentioned in Prof. Kastenberg’s lecture). It 
has only been in this summer school that I have been formally (i.e., in an academic 
framework) asked to think about how to break this cycle.
Many senior figures in the nuclear industry or academia seem to try to groom stu-
dents to become advocates of nuclear power, rather than educating us to be holistic 
thinkers on top of being experts in our field. Unfortunately, too often in the greater 
nuclear engineering community, the issues surrounding the implementation of nuclear 
energy, from siting power plants to waste disposal sites, are brushed off as “a social 
issue.” Statements like that usually have the flavor of an afterthought. Such a paradigm 
has bred a nuclear engineering community, in Japan and elsewhere, which was unpre-
pared to meaningfully interact with the public and understand its views and fears.
Our traditional engineering training tells us there is one “right” way to view a 
problem, and that we engineers are the only ones who understand the “true” way 
to come up with a solution. I think we need to continue to challenge the traditions 
as we have done in this summer school, students, organizers, and lecturers alike. 
Specifically in the nuclear engineering field, academic research and thought is still 
intimately tied to the rigid nuclear industry (to varying degrees in different coun-
tries). After a major shakeup of our discipline’s foundations at Fukushima, both 
literally and figuratively, the necessity of introspective, “blue-sky” discussions has 
never been more obvious to me. Something is flawed in our discipline, and we need 
to start by opening new avenues within our community’s academic and educational 
philosophy. This summer school has been an invaluable step in the right direction.
17.2.4  Role of Nuclear Professionals After Fukushima,  
by Kenta Horio, the University of Tokyo
The Fukushima nuclear accident caused a significant impact on Japan. Many peo-
ple were forced to evacuate from their homes, energy shortage deeply affected the 
economy, and people’s distrust of nuclear energy has become tremendous. Also, 
there are a lot of difficult tasks to be done by nuclear professionals, such as stabi-
lization of the accident, clean-up of contaminated areas, ensuring and improving 
safety of existing nuclear power plants, recovering melted fuels, and decommis-
sioning damaged reactors.
Whether we will continue to use nuclear energy in the future or not, rebuilding 
confidence in the general public is essential for us nuclear professionals, since we 
already have hundreds of reactors all over the world. In order to rebuild confidence 
in the general public, we have to reconsider our role in society. The conventional 
role of nuclear professionals in society was to provide technical information about 
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nuclear energy, such as risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, etc. How did we conduct 
this role? Was it sufficient? Or are there any other roles which we should perform for 
society? These are questions which we have to think about and find some answers.
I’m still convinced that the conventional role of nuclear professionals, provid-
ing information, is essential, since people need reliable, technical information to 
make decisions on nuclear policy and energy policy. But I also consider we have 
to be much more sensitive in our attitude towards the general public. Most techni-
cal information, such as simulations, calculations, or forecasts, contains some sort 
of uncertainties and assumptions which do not appear clearly when the outcomes 
are shown as numbers. Though some people are not accustomed to dealing with 
uncertainties or assumptions, we have to explain technical information, including 
uncertainties and assumptions, in a sincere and honest manner. Otherwise, infor-
mation won’t be truly meaningful and we won’t be trusted in a real sense.
In addition to the above conventional role, I’m wondering if there are other roles 
which we should play. Since the culture of engineering is utilitarianism, our strong-
est assets and tools are based on a utilitarian way of thinking. But utilitarianism is 
not the only philosophy of modern society, especially in current Japan, and there 
are other major social values. Though I’m not sure whether it is possible to justify 
use of nuclear energy without utilitarianism, it might be our role to facilitate dis-
cussions among people with different sets of values and to help them to bridge the 
gaps. At least, we have to understand various social values and gaps among them.
The above are my thoughts on our role in society after Fukushima and I haven’t 
yet reached any concrete conclusion. But at least, I have no doubt that we have to 
play a certain role in society and I consider we have to keep thinking about what our 
role is, not only with engineering methods but also with social scientific literacy.
17.2.5  Risk Analysis and Public Confidence,  
by Naomi Kaida, the University of Tokyo
In this summer school, lecturers and students proposed various arguments. In this 
essay, however, I would like to focus on two points: one is an answer to the ques-
tion posed by Professor Kastenberg, and the other is an extension of the discussion 
among the students. The construction of this essay is as follows. Firstly, a response 
to the question is proposed. The question is about improvement of risk analysis 
and avoiding loss of public confidence. Secondly, further thoughts about the dis-
cussion are suggested. The main point of the argument is the relationship between 
social decision-making and nuclear engineers. One of the students said that it was 
society that would make a decision about whether to stop using nuclear power, 
and he would obey the social determination as an engineer. However, this essay 
suggests that the social/technical dichotomy is meaningless. Finally, an integrated 
idea of the whole is demonstrated: to construct or reconstruct public confidence, 
arguments in more detail among nuclear engineers are needed.
Professor Kastenberg posed some interesting questions, and one of them is, 
“What would it take to improve the quality of risk analysis and emergency planning 
326 B. Cary
so that the loss of public confidence could have been avoided?” Regrettably, risk 
analysis on nuclear power plants and emergency planning has not been sufficient in 
Japan. Emergency planning has been especially weak because power utilities had 
stressed that there was almost no danger that severe accidents at nuclear power plants 
would occur in Japan. Moreover, conducting emergency planning had been regarded 
as acknowledging the possibility of severe accidents at nuclear power plants. This 
caused weakness in emergency planning in Japan. Therefore, in order to avoid the 
loss of public confidence, or to reconstruct public confidence, information about risk 
and what will be done in case of emergency must be released to the public. Although 
it is too late to gain public confidence after the Fukushima accident occurred, disclo-
sure is still needed not only by Japanese, but also by people all around the world.
Disclosure is an important keyword when people think about public confidence 
in nuclear power, but I would like to point out one more significant way of think-
ing. It is about the relationship between society and technology. In the discussion 
among students, one student said that it was society that would make the decision 
whether to stop using nuclear power in Japan, and if the public decided to with-
draw from using all of the nuclear power plants, he would abide by the decision. 
However, I felt somewhat puzzled by his words, because he seems to assume that 
withdrawing from using nuclear power is not a technical but a social issue. Is it 
a purely social problem or a purely technical problem regarding the Fukushima 
accident and nuclear power policy in Japan? For instance, the emergency workers’ 
dose limit, transmission of information, the radiation level for school playgrounds, 
etc.: every problem revealed has aspects of both social and technical problems. 
Why is only the withdrawal issue regarded as a purely social problem? When peo-
ple think about the Fukushima accident and the future of nuclear power in Japan, 
the social/technical dichotomy is useless. Therefore, not only the public but also 
nuclear engineers have to discuss whether to stop using nuclear power and how to 
realize a safe phasing out of nuclear power.
As shown above, I think disclosure and in-depth discussion among nuclear 
engineers are necessary to achieve public confidence on nuclear power. While 
doing so, engineers should not think of society and nuclear technology separately. 
Public suspicion about nuclear power is becoming worse. People suspect that 
engineers, utilities, and the government suppress the facts about radioactive sub-
stances. In order to rebuild public confidence, unprecedented discussions and sug-
gestions have to be proposed by nuclear engineers. For example, how to stop using 
nuclear power safely, how to renew or do away with nuclear power plants.
17.2.6  Benefits Versus Risk,  
by Keisuke Kawahara, the University of Tokyo
I was wondering whether nuclear power can be acceptable to the public. So I chose 
the question from Dr. Samuel Walker: “Are the benefits of nuclear power worth the 
risks?” The answer is “yes” from engineers, but “no” from the public side.
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Engineers have been making efforts to assess costs quantitatively using risk 
benefit analysis. This analysis, which can be applied at probability from 10−4 to 
10−6, is regarded as the most effective and persuasive method to justify nuclear 
power so far. However, the public seems to be unable to accept using the analy-
sis and cutting off the risk below 10−6 considering that there still exists a pos-
sibility for accidents to occur. This kind of discrepancy can be found between 
engineers and the public, though it is not realistic to take into account some-
thing that would hardly ever occur. There are three points which generate this 
discrepancy.
First, cut-off risks below the probability of 10−6 are decided by engineers, 
regarding such a probability equal to a natural disaster that should be socially 
acceptable. However, the cut-off line may not be acceptable to the public, because 
the outcome of the accident is related to human activities, even if its initial cause 
was due to a natural disaster. In addition, from the Fukushima accident, the public 
realized again that the damage from the nuclear plant was so huge that they might 
get less and less tolerant of accepting such a way of thinking.
Second, the difference in accidents between nuclear power and other risks is 
that the damage from nuclear power is concentrated in space and time. This char-
acter of nuclear power accidents increases the risk which the public feels from 
the perspective of fairness and makes people more emotional. In that case, the 
public cannot calculate the risk as “probability times damage” and risk over-
whelms the benefit.
Finally, it is difficult for the public to judge results of quantitative analysis. The 
public reacts sensitively to risks and makes irrational choices while we engineers 
ask them to accept quantitative judgments. But making irrational choices is human 
and making rational choices is inhuman, which hinders accepting decisions based 
on quantitative cost-benefit analysis.
I could not come up with a clear solution to such a discrepancy from attend-
ing this summer school but can only recognize what lies between them. Widening 
the territory of risk benefit analysis is not meaningful, and it would be hard for 
the public to completely accept the analysis. However, it must be meaningful to 
be aware of the discrepancy and, by understanding this condition, both engineers 
and the public can walk together through the tough path of risk communication. If 
the benefits of nuclear power exceed the risk from the public side, that is not from 
conventional risk communication based on risk benefit analysis but from commu-
nication taking into account such a discrepancy.
17.2.7  Was Mr. Yoshida Ethical?  
by Lukis MacKie, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
During his lecture, Dr. Jun Fudano of the Kanazawa Institute of Technology posed 
a rather deep question to the students: “Was Mr. Masao Yoshida ethical?” The 
answer is yes.
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Mr. Yoshida is the plant manager of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant and was on site in the time immediately following the March 11 tsunami. 
When the ability to cool the reactor’s nuclear core with fresh, clean water was lost, 
the plant workers began pumping salt water through. While salt contacting the fuel 
rods would accelerate their deterioration, this solution was preferable to not cool-
ing the nuclear material at all.
This action was reported to the highest levels of the Japanese government and 
began to trickle down the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) senior man-
agement. Aware that the central government was concerned with some possible 
negative ramifications of this endeavor, TEPCO’s executives leaned forward and 
directed salt water cooling activities to cease. Mr. Yoshida received this order and 
not only decided to ignore it, but misled his corporate leadership by telling them 
that salt water was no longer being pumped onto the reactor cores.
According to the Josephson Institute of Ethics: “Ethics refers to principles that 
define behavior as right, good and proper. Such principles do not always dictate 
a single ‘moral’ course of action, but provide a means of evaluating and decid-
ing among competing options.” (Josephson Institute of Ethics. “Making Ethical 
Decisions”. Web. 2011).
Some are questioning Yoshida-san’s ethical fortitude because he disobeyed an 
order from his leaders while at the same time actively deceiving them. It is rea-
sonable to believe that if he disobeyed the order and informed those up his chain 
of command that he planned to continue cooling the reactors with salt water, 
he might have been given more external “assistance” than he desired. It is not 
unreasonable to believe that, if he had informed them of his actions, TEPCO’s 
upper management might have removed him from his post and replaced him 
with a “yes man.”
If Mr. Yoshida had followed orders and ceased using salt water cooling, it is 
almost impossible to conclude that the outcome would have improved. If no cool-
ant had been used, the meltdown would have accelerated drastically. This would 
likely have caused considerably more damage to the surrounding area, and quickly 
raised radiation levels in the plant too high for personnel to continue working. 
While contaminated seawater was released back into the ocean, this should be 
seen as the lesser of two evils and the more desired result given the seemingly 
only other alternative.
During a crisis, particularly one that is evolving and growing more danger-
ous by the hour, it is often ill-advised to remove/replace essential personnel and 
increase bureaucracy. Micro-management from personnel more concerned with 
politics and less knowledgeable about the full spectrum of events on location can 
slow down time-critical decisions drastically.
Removing the on-site commander can be just as devastating—but sometimes 
it is necessary. A new commander most probably lacks the history and important 
details of how the situation reached its current point in time, and back-briefing him 
or her will cause delays. However, if the person currently in charge has proved 
incapable of handling the situation properly, a replacement (hopefully an early 
replacement) is needed.
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If Yoshida had informed upper management of his plans to continue using sea 
water as the coolant, they might have decided a replacement capable of following 
orders was necessary and the best solution for the emergency at hand.
Masao Yoshida was the right person for the job. While it is probable that 
other TEPCO employees with thirty-plus years of experience could have man-
aged the situation properly, none would have known the plant as well as he, nor 
would they have been there from day zero. By continuing to pump sea water 
through the reactor core, Mr. Yoshida controlled the radiation leakage as best he 
could. By lying to his superiors, Yoshida-san controlled the entire situation as 
best as he could.
Some members of the public, and certainly some members of TEPCO, are 
questioning Yoshida’s ethics because he did not follow instruction and he lied to 
his leadership about it. Just as the Josephson study stated, the plant manager was 
left to decide “… among competing options.”
Based on his experience and on-site knowledge of the situation, Yoshida-san 
made the call to continue using salt water to cool the reactor and deceive his lead-
ership. Those judging his principles could see this as two ethical failures.
However, anyone questioning him must be asked one thing: If Yoshida had 
stopped using salt water to cool the reactor—or continued using the salt water 
but been truthful with his leadership, which might have resulted in his swift 
removal—the radiation contamination would have been much worse. If this had 
occurred, would you be questioning his ethics then?
Mr. Yoshida acted ethically. He had an understanding of the ground zero situa-
tion better than any member of his senior leadership, and better than any member 
of Japan’s central government.
Given all the factors, he made the decision that he believed would result in the 
lowest possible radiation dose to his employees and his countrymen. He disobeyed 
and misled those above him; he shepherded the plant workers below him and the 
civilians who had no say in the matter but needed him to keep them as safe as 
possible.
Question Mr. Masao Yoshida’s loyalty to TEPCO. Question his faith in the 
company’s senior executives. And, if you choose, question his ethical fortitude. 
And when you are done second guessing his ability to determine right from 
wrong, thank him for the decisions he made.
17.2.8  Safety Culture and the Accident,  
by Hiroshi Madokoro, the University of Tokyo
My essay is a response to the question raised by Prof. William E. Kastenberg: Was 
there an adequate “safety culture” in place prior to and following the accident?
I think a “safety culture” existed before the Fukushima disaster, but not an ade-
quate one. Most of us believed without doubt that we had done enough prepara-
tion for accidents. Some people argued that there is a certain probability for an 
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accident to occur, but preparation was not sufficient. I wonder why people didn’t 
do anything to prepare for a future accident. I think this has something to do with 
Japanese people’s behavior.
Through discussions in this summer school, I found out there is something 
in common in Japanese people’s minds. Japanese people tend to pursue comfort 
more than people in other countries do. We don’t like to think about tiresome 
things. That is our usual behavior, but what was bad was that we also took such an 
attitude even toward safety management. This is one of the causes that worsened 
this accident. We avoided discussing “accidents,” because we don’t like to hear 
words like “accidents” or “risks” and because we assumed that a terrible event 
never occurs.
What is important is that we have to think about normal culture and “safety 
culture” separately. I heard that, even in the U.S., safety culture is different from 
normal culture. As I wrote above, Japanese people always want to be in a com-
fort state and avoid thinking about troublesome matters. However, because the 
Fukushima accident has occurred, we’d better change our attitude. We should no 
longer take this attitude toward nuclear safety. People involved in safety man-
agement need to know this culture and our behavior, and take pains to think 
about safety management and regulations as much as they can. I insist that 
“safety culture” cannot be a universal law, but the idea of “safety culture” can 
be generalized throughout the world. When we think about “safety culture” in 
Japan, we should not just import the safety culture of the U.S. or other coun-
tries. It is better that we import the concept of “safety culture” from the U.S., 
and then adjust it to Japanese culture, as we consider our culture. Also I con-
ceive that each culture cannot be altered. Neither can the way people at large 
think and act. It is the particular people who take part in nuclear programs who 
should change.
People engaged in safety management or regulation need to take pains for the 
safety of nuclear energy, even though the probability of a terrible event is very 
low. It is hard for them to do so because of our culture. However, it is our respon-
sibility to make nuclear energy safer and safer.
I believe that Japan can be an exemplar of safety to developing countries that 
do not yet have the idea of “safety culture.” Each of the developing countries that 
introduce nuclear power within a few decades need to adjust the concept of “safety 
culture” to their country. In that process they can refer to the Japanese case.
17.2.9  Information Sharing at the Accident,  
by Haruyuki Ogino, the University of Tokyo
My essay responds to the lecture by Prof. Satoru Tanaka. I would like to describe 
how to improve the transmission of information by giving two illustrations of cri-
sis communication implemented after the Fukushima nuclear accident. One is the 
press conference and the other is the distribution of information through the web.
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With regard to the press conference, first of all, the spokesman should be 
trusted by the public and should be a person who can take responsibility. In 
this context, he or she should be a politician. Furthermore, the information 
should be given not only by the spokesman but also by experts in order to 
deliver precise information to the public and to meet the demand of reporters. 
Misunderstanding due to ambiguous explanations by a non-professional can 
lead to harmful rumor and panic. Taking these aspects into account, the press 
conference after the Fukushima nuclear accident should have been given in 
cooperation with both the chief cabinet secretary and experts from such agen-
cies as the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, at the same time and place. 
We discussed the above useful and transparent communication in an emer-
gency situation, and the American students also agreed on this point in the 
summer school.
The next illustration is the distribution of information through the web. After 
the accident, a huge amount of information was distributed day by day through 
the web about the reactor conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, water level) and 
environmental conditions (e.g., radioactivity concentration in air, dose rate, sur-
face contamination density). In other words, the public with access to the web 
was exposed to this huge amount of information without explanations of how to 
understand and act on it. Of course it is very important to disclose all informa-
tion, but the sender should always pay attention to the recipient when information 
is sent out. In this context, the sender should have added the essence or intel-
ligence that summarized the huge amount of information. We should also pay 
attention to the problems of how to deliver the information to the public with-
out access to the web, such as evacuees. One solution may be a newsletter to 
the evacuees that summarizes the current situation on reactor and environmental 
conditions. This information should be delivered to those who really need it for 
their lives near the site.
Finally, what is needed when the information can be transmitted smoothly is 
“public trust” over nuclear safety. The loss of public trust was widely discussed in 
the summer school and we know that it will be extremely difficult to restore it in a 
short period of time. Thus it is our responsibility as the younger generation to keep 
going to achieve the long-term goal.
17.2.10  Risk Perception and Communication,  
by Petrus, Tokai University
After the Fukushima accident caused by the tsunami on March 11, the public had 
lost their trust in the safety of nuclear power plants. But, as we have seen in many 
disasters, people will not protect themselves if they don’t believe their lives are at 
risk. Changing the way people perceive danger is an important way to save lives. 
To change the way people think, we must have specific plans for communicating 
the risks of dangers they could probably face.
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“Sharing” is one of the ways to know how the public thinks about nuclear 
power plants before and after the accident. The public is not monolithic. Some 
people will be directly affected by the risk and some will be indirectly affected. 
We have to share all of the information transparently, not only information 
about safety but also about the risk of nuclear power plants that might result 
when the nuclear power plants operate. It’s difficult to make people perceive 
this risk, because the public has realized that it is not true that “NPP is abso-
lutely safe” or “safety first” is the foundation of nuclear plants. In this condi-
tion, engineers can take a role to improve the safety and design to make plants 
as safe as possible.
Understanding a public risk typically involves the range of benefits and costs 
associated with nuclear power plants. All aspects of the risk need to be thought 
through and explained, or the dialogue about the risk may become dominated 
by one part of the analysis. This risk-benefit analysis can be used as our tool 
to help us demonstrate the limit of the public risk. However, transparency of 
the information is better than “hiding” the information from the public. Lack 
of information may cause one to have exaggerated fears regarding the possi-
ble risk of a certain situation. Without factual information, we make uninformed 
decisions.
If the risk is considered to be the government’s or the local government’s 
responsibility, then our role as engineers may be more to coordinate and to support 
rather than to take responsibility. In this case, public trust in the government also 
plays a major role. When the government and engineers are not highly trusted, for 
example after the accident, we can only share accurate information, whether or not 
the public can take it in. Deliberative processes can provide an inclusive way of 
involving the public in seeking their views but these also need to be fair.
17.2.11  Radiation Risk Communication,  
by Kazumasa Shimada, the University of Tokyo
My essay is to respond to questions raised by Prof. Kosako related to the issue of 
radiation risk communication and estimated number of cancer deaths based on the 
collective dose.
Calculating the number of cancer deaths based on the collective effective dose 
caused by very small exposure to a large population has a very huge uncertainty 
because, statistically and biologically, it is incorrect usage of the amount of protec-
tion (ICRP, Pub.103, paragraph 161).
On the other hand, the Chernobyl Forum (performed in several international 
organizations; IAEA, WHO) reported that targeting about 600,000 people [decon-
tamination personnel (average. dose is 100 mSv), evacuees (10 mSv), most con-
taminated local residents (50 mSv)], the number of deaths is expected to be 4,000 
people and targeting about 6,800,000 people [public and workers (average dose is 
7 mSv)], the number of deaths is expected to be 9,000 people (Chernobyl Forum, 
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Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts and 
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine. IAEA, 2005). In addition, in the report of Cardis in 2006, it is said that 
the number of deaths is expected to be 16,000 people (CRIEPI, health effects of 
Chernobyl Research Center for Radiation Safety Accident http://criepi.denken.
or.jp/jp/ldrc/study/topics/20060904.html).
The Fukushima nuclear accident was evaluated to be INES level 7. Therefore, 
calculation of the number of cancer deaths based on collective dose is unavoida-
ble. If someone calculates the number of deaths based on radiation by this accident 
as a few hundred people, how is this to be explained to the public, especially the 
people of Fukushima? At this time, we have no answer to the question: “How do I 
know if my child will be one of the few hundred victims?”.
Nowadays, we cannot identify whether this cancer is due to radiation. In the 
future, some cancer patients will likely go to court about the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. If the court decides to accept a causal connection between low dose and 
cancer, I am concerned that all cancer will be viewed as radiation. This situation is 
like the atomic bomb case.
In my opinion, it is against humanism to calculate the number of deaths. We 
should rethink the meaning of low dose radiation risk.
I propose to develop two things. One is a total health risk evaluation. The other 
is a minus-dose evaluation. The total health risk evaluation is to be considered with 
radiation, ultra-violet ray, chemical material, mental stress, etc., to evaluate human 
health risk. Nowadays, only the radiation risk is evaluated quantitatively and gives 
some cause for anxiety. Therefore, it is important to know that radiation is not a 
special cancer risk compared with other risks even if this evaluation has a huge 
uncertainty. Moreover, minus-dose evaluation is more important. Today, Linear 
Non-Threshold model (LNT model) can evaluate the cumulative radiation risk for-
ever. Therefore, people have no way to escape radiation to reduce risk. On the other 
hand, we can find protection functions in our body, for example DNA repair, apop-
tosis, radioadaptive response, and immunity. This means radiation damage in our 
body is continually being repaired by these functions. To make quantity evaluations 
of these functions we can calculate that the dose was canceled by these minus-
doses. For example, to increase our immunity function to reduce cancer risks quan-
titatively, we use methods of ordinary health promotion (for example, spas) so that 
our radiation risk will be canceled and our health will actually become better.
17.2.12  Benefits Versus Risks,  
by Kampanart Silva, the University of Tokyo
Are the benefits of nuclear power worth the risks? The question raised by 
Dr. J. Samuel Walker stimulated me to write this essay. There are some questions 
which needed to be and could be answered in order to specify the scope of the 
decision making and finally move toward the progress of answering the question.
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Where is this question asked?
If it is asked in developed countries, such as the U.S. or Japan, with the money 
and resources that those countries have, and the high level of education of the 
population, there are a number of choices for electric power supply and the popu-
lation has the ability to correctly select them. Therefore, we can easily move to 
the next question. However, if it is asked in developing countries, where rapid 
energy growth is a requisite condition, and the population does not even know 
what would be the consequences of their choices, there comes another question 
very difficult to answer: is it ethically preferable to ensure their rights to select the 
energy sources?
To whom is this question is asked?
If it is asked of an individual, and if that individual is an expert, he (or she) 
might try to quantitatively analyze the risk and the benefit based on the data he 
has, include some of his personal perceptions, and finally give you the answer. 
(Perhaps this is also what I am going to do.) If not an expert, he might emotionally 
give you the answer based on the information he has. But when it comes to a deci-
sion of a country or a society, apart from achieving the utility (by quantifying the 
risks and the benefits and make sure that the benefits are worth the risks), the fair-
ness among the society members must also be taken into account by some means 
or other.
When is the answer needed?
In the case of decision on the energy policy of a country, when it has money 
and resources, which means it has the chance to choose its preferred energy 
resources, the answer to the question “are the benefits of nuclear power worth the 
risks?” might not be needed until the next decade or even the next century because 
its energy production potential is several times the demand. On the other hand, for 
a country with small potential, it might need the answer within several years or 
even several months. In that case, the only thing it can do is to try to improve and 
make use of the tool (risk-benefit analysis) it has, and set up some system to obtain 
as much as possible the perceptions of its public.
Under this circumstance, regarding the results of risk-benefit analysis being done 
by developed countries, even after including the social impacts (public anxiety or 
opposition movements) or ethical issues (which came up in the answer to the first 
question) to be observed, I still personally think that the benefits of nuclear power 
in Thailand are worth the risks, for the time being. However, this is based on the 
present information I have. If in the future, the possibility of severe accidents is to 
become tens or hundreds of times what we see now, and the social and economic 
impacts are proved to be much larger than what they are now, this evaluation may 
change. In my personal view, the most important thing is to be able to judge the 
risks and benefits under the present circumstance with limited information, and take 
responsibility for the judgment, no matter whether you are an individual, an expert, 
or a decision maker.
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17.2.13  Benefits of Nuclear Power,  
by Christina Novila Soewono, Tokai University
The nuclear accident that occurred at Fukushima, Japan, has brought people’s 
attention to the risks of nuclear power. While there had not been direct human cost 
in deaths because of the nuclear accident itself, people once again are faced with 
the question whether nuclear power benefit is worth the risks. It is natural to fear 
what you cannot see and many people do not find enough reassurance in being 
told that they are not at risk from the radiation that had been released.
With the rate of increasing demand of our current energy needs and the inef-
fectiveness of current methods, I will say that nuclear power is worth the risk. By 
agreeing that nuclear power is worth the risk, I am not saying that nuclear is com-
pletely safe nor that there are no alternatives, but I agree that nuclear is the better 
alternative and therefore worth it.
So far there have been no confirmed casualties of deaths directly attributed 
to the Fukushima nuclear accident. This showed us that despite the old age of 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor, nuclear power plant safety has been greatly 
improved since the Chernobyl accident. There were 64 confirmed deaths from 
radiation and a prediction of 60,000 cancer deaths as a result of fallout from 
Chernobyl. Though it is hard to predict the number of cancer deaths caused by 
radiation exposure, since precautionary action had been taken to protect the 
public, I believe that the predicted number of cancer deaths is going to be a lot 
fewer than Chernobyl.
The Fukushima nuclear accident has induced fear and inconvenience to the 
public, especially those who lived near the Fukushima site. The feelings of 
insecurity, unsafeness, inconvenience, and other effects are difficult to meas-
ure. The interesting part is that so far I think that coal power is far more dan-
gerous to human life and long-term health issues than nuclear power. A coal 
powered plant releases more radioactivity than a well maintained nuclear 
power plant. In addition to that, a coal powered plant releases more pollutants, 
especially gases which contribute to global warming. Since coal is likely to be 
more hazardous than nuclear we should fear coal more than nuclear. And yet, 
people seem to be more comfortable with coal power plants than nuclear power 
plants.
Due to its effectiveness in producing energy on a large scale and ensuring 
energy security, I think that nuclear power plants are economically worth the 
risk. Japan did not have enough natural resources, which was the reason why 
Japan developed nuclear as an energy source during the postwar period in the 
first place. The energy availability in Japan supported industries which then led 
Japan to be the first Asian developed country that succeeded in catching up with 
Western countries.
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Nowadays people have started to develop renewable energy that not 
only can be used to produce electricity but also is environmentally friendly. 
Unfortunately, if renewable energy sources such as wind and solar are used as 
energy with current technology, they are not only unreliable, but also not use-
ful in some geographic areas due to weather patterns. Since not many people 
are familiar with the use of renewable energy, the cost of generating electricity 
is relatively high. I do believe that in the future we can overcome this problem 
faced by renewable energy and finally have a clean energy source. Until then, 
however, it is good to use nuclear power which I think is more reliable and cost 
effective.
17.2.14  Who Am I? What Is My Own Role on Earth?  
by Shin-etsu Sugawara, the University of Tokyo
This summer school has posed these challenges to me. During the last presentation 
of our group, a question from Dr. Juraku was of grave significance to me: what is 
your role?—not the role of “engineer” as a general noun.
This reflection shows my own reply to this.
Throughout the full program of this summer school, the “limitation” of cost-
benefit analysis and the “irrationality” of social decision-making were major top-
ics of discussion. In particular, our group focused on the issue of how nuclear 
engineers provide their expertise in society under conditions where the decision-
making methods about energy policies look so “irrational” from their point of 
view in Japan and in some other countries.
Re-examining this discussion, however, I now think that our framing was too 
narrow and too ironical. That is because engineers’ activities, which are said to be 
based on “rational” thoughts, failed to control nuclear technology, and as a result 
made society “irrational.” In other words, it is engineers who want to “improve” 
society that drive society toward the opposite direction.
This is applied not only to the Fukushima accident but also to all the failures, 
misconducts, and “unexpected” accidents which are related to science and tech-
nology. And, this is not valid simply for each engineer but for all the persons and 
organizations who stand on the side of promoting science and technology.
These FACTS are, I think, the biggest “failures” of engineers and the points 
which should be considered to be the responsibility of everyone concerned with 
nuclear technology—of course including me—in the historical context.
Reflecting on these considerations, I will give an opinion of my own role.
I am not a nuclear engineer. I am a researcher tackling nuclear issues based 
on social-scientific methodologies. I now recognize my special role as a “bound-
ary worker” as follows: to show available prescriptions—sometimes ideal ones—
for dealing with risks associated with the social utilization of nuclear technology, 
including socially amplified risks; that is, to envisage and to publish the social 
systems where expertise is referenced appropriately in social decision-making 
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processes; and to maintain the relationship between expertise and social decision 
in the face of extreme fluctuation.
Such roles have a substantial overlap with my own studies over 4 years. I can 
now be more confident on this point.
This is my principle in the profession of “boundary worker” between nuclear tech-
nology and society. Wherever I go after my graduation, I shall hold on to this principle.
17.2.15  The Role of Nuclear Engineers in Society,  
by Tatsuhiko Sugiyama, the University of Tokyo
Through the summer school, I became interested in the role of engineers in dis-
closing information, and I was particularly intrigued by Prof. Satoru Tanaka’s 
question: How can we improve the transmission of information? I have reinforced 
my idea that this kind of topic involves some ethical issues and we cannot clearly 
decide what to do, especially in emergency situations. On the point of “transmis-
sion,” however, I have found some problems and some ideas to improve the way 
information is transmitted.
In the Fukushima case, the major problem in transmitting information was 
that engineers or professionals were not trying to let citizens fully understand 
the meaning of the information they disclosed. They were mainly disclosing 
numerical data unfamiliar to citizens and the mass media were doing “inter-
pretation” of these data. Moreover, press conferences were conducted without 
engineers or professionals. This led to multiple interpretations among citizens 
about “how serious is the accident?,” “should we evacuate as soon as possi-
ble?,” and so on.
In my opinion, engineers or professionals have to try to do what mass media 
are now doing and try to explain with or on behalf of politicians, especially in 
crisis communications. I agree they disclosed enough data in the Fukushima 
case. But this is not enough. In order to prevent panic or incorrect behavior, they 
themselves must try to let citizens understand without going through the media. 
They have to reconsider the role of engineers or professionals in emergency 
situations.
If our society allows the continued use of nuclear power, what are the attributes 
needed for a nuclear system in the new era? I will try to think about this question 
based on a concrete image/concept of the new nuclear system (reactor plant and its 
fuel cycle).
One factor that caused station blackout (SBO) was that the isolation condenser 
(IC) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) batteries were not sufficient to 
survive for a long period. One advantage of IC and RCIC is that they can utilize 
vapor from the reactor to operate. But if they also need batteries to operate, I think 
this system is nonsense. Emergency core cooling systems should be isolated from 
such anxieties.
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In my opinion, however robust a plant may be designed, some residual risks 
remain. Through the Fukushima case, we have gained some ideas on future reactor 
designs. But even if we adopt all these ideas, reactors will not be perfectly robust, 
and most of the people who are against the usage of NPPs often quote this prob-
lem. We have to clearly admit the existence of residual risk in the future design.
17.2.16  The Role of Nuclear Engineers in Society,  
by Eva Uribe, University of California, Berkeley
What is the role of nuclear engineers in society? As a scientist, and not an engi-
neer, the summer school made me think about the relationship between science 
and engineering, and how both interact with society. During the conference, one 
of my colleagues, an engineer, made the observation that science is about discov-
ery, while engineering is about optimization. Engineers make the knowledge of 
science useful to others through optimization of that knowledge to specific prob-
lems. The National Society of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics makes engi-
neers responsible first to society: “Engineering has a direct and vital impact on 
the quality of life for all people. Accordingly, the services provided by engineers 
require honesty, impartiality, fairness, and equity, and must be dedicated to the 
protection of the public health, safety, and welfare” (Preamble, emphasis added). 
The American Chemical Society also published a Chemical Professionals Code of 
Conduct, which establishes a primary responsibility to the public: “Chemical pro-
fessionals have a responsibility to serve the public interest and safety and to fur-
ther advance the knowledge of science.”
While the engineering ethical code speaks of “services” to the public, the 
ACS code encourages scientists to “advance the knowledge of science.” During 
the summer school, many asked the question how we could justify nuclear energy 
outside of the cost/benefit paradigm used by engineers to decide which problems 
to solve and how to solve them. My initial reaction was to justify nuclear energy 
based on the progress of science and the general advancement of knowledge. Very 
generally speaking, my opinion is that we should learn more about splitting the 
atom not only so that we may better control it, but also because this process is fun-
damental to how the universe works, and we as inquisitive beings should want to 
know how everything works. This kind of pursuit of knowledge allows scientists 
to justify research that others may consider unethical or immoral, such as embry-
onic stem cell research or even human cloning. During the conference, I began to 
understand that the engineering profession cannot be so easily isolated from public 
interests, even in the name of advancing knowledge, because its central creed is to 
serve the public.
The debate lies in the form that this service shall take, a dilemma not exclu-
sive to engineering, but rather common to all professions. What happens when the 
experts and the public disagree about what is best for society? Who should decide? 
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The educated minority, or the majority? James Madison, one of the founders of 
the United States Constitution, wrote about this dilemma in Federalist Paper #10. 
Madison and many of his contemporaries believed that a strict democracy would 
be very dangerous, because it would allow the majority to suppress the rights of 
the minority simply by force of numbers. To combat such a tendency in govern-
ment, they sought to found not a democracy, but a republic, in which elected rep-
resentatives of the people govern the nation, rather than the people directly. His 
words, then spoken about political representatives, are also relevant to nuclear 
engineering professionals today when it comes to nuclear energy policy. He argues 
that representative government “refines and enlarges the public views by passing 
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best 
discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice 
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations … it may 
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the peo-
ple, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people 
themselves” (Federalist Paper #10). A representative must often look beyond local 
interests and seek to serve broader and deeper interests. But a representative is also 
directly responsible to the public. Engineers may be considered representatives of 
the public to the progress of technology. Scientists unveil what is known and what 
may be known, and engineers decide how this knowledge can be incorporated into 
people’s daily lives. As representatives of the people, engineers are also directly 
responsible to them. But unlike politicians, who risk losing votes if they displease 
the public, engineers have much more at stake: the credibility of the profession, 
the usefulness of scientific progression, and the inquisitiveness of humankind. This 
is why their dedication to honesty, openness, and education is so important.
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